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Abstract
Through the enhanced connectivity of physical devices, the Internet of Things (IoT) brings improved
efficiency to the lives of consumers when on-the-go and in the home. However, it also introduces
new potential security threats and risks. These include threats that range from the direct hacking of
devices that could undermine the security, privacy and safety of its users, to the enslaving of IoT devi-
ces to commit cybercrime at scale, such as Denial of Service attacks. The IoT is recognized as being
widely insecure, in large part, due to the lack of security features built into devices. Additionally, con-
sumers do not always actively use security features when available. More disconcerting is that we
lack market surveillance on whether manufacturers ship products with good security features or how
the importance of user-controlled security features is explained to IoT users. Our study seeks to ad-
dress this gap. To do this, we compiled a database of 270 consumer IoT devices produced by 220 dif-
ferent manufacturers on sale at the time of the study. The user manuals and associated support
pages for these devices were then analysed to provide a ‘consumer eye’ view of the security features
they provide and the cyber hygiene advice that is communicated to users. The security features iden-
tified were then mapped to the UK Government’s Secure by Design Code of Practice for IoT devices
to examine the extent to which devices currently on the market appear to conform to it. Our findings
suggest that manufacturers provide too little publicly available information about the security fea-
tures of their devices, which makes market surveillance challenging and provides consumers with lit-
tle information about the security of devices prior to their purchase. On average, there was discus-
sion of around four security features, with account management and software updates being the
most frequently mentioned. Advice to consumers on cyber hygiene was rarely provided. Finally, we
found a lack of standardization in the communication of security-related information for IoT devices
among our sample. We argue for government intervention in this space to provide assurances
around device security, whether this is provided in a centralized or decentralized manner.
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Introduction
The next wave of technological revolution is hyped to be the
Internet of Things (IoT). These ‘things’ are Internet-connected devi-
ces that collect and share data over the Internet. This increased
connectivity can help to improve their functionality and efficiency
but in doing so also generates new potential threats and risks. Some
of these devices represent new products (e.g. personal assistants) but
many were once everyday household items such as light bulbs,
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thermostats and door locks. To provide an example of the risks
these devices bring, consider that traditionally, protecting one’s
home generally only required adequate physical security measures.
However, with the Internet connectedness that the IoT affords, pro-
tecting one’s home now involves a cyber element with risks that no
longer rely on geographical location. Among other things, threats to
this cyber element can allow offenders to circumvent the very con-
ventional physical security measures that protect our homes—door
locks, windows and so on. IoT products can also interact with the
home environment in new and innovative ways, and actuators with-
in the products can directly impact on critical services within the
home, such as heating systems. The disruption to such services can
thus impact on human life and well-being [1] and as such, the secur-
ity of the IoT is paramount to protect consumer’s privacy, security
and now physical safety [2].
However, most consumer IoT devices that are sold on the market
are not secure by design [3]. Manufacturers lack the capacity to sup-
port modern security controls and updates [4] and are not sufficient-
ly focused on security and privacy as a design priority [5]. In reality,
security is left to the end stages of product design and in some cases,
left until the product is on the market [6]. This is an unintended con-
sequence of the ‘lean’ and agile product development life cycle that
businesses choose to adopt. This is perhaps not surprising as there is
currently little (if any) economic incentive for manufacturers to ad-
dress security and there exists no regulation [2]. Consequently, as se-
curity is not prioritized, we continue to see examples of how
insecure IoT devices are. For example, a 2014 study by HP found
that 7 of the 10 most popular devices contained vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with encryption and password security [7]. An investigation
by which found that 8 out of 15 tested devices, which included Wi-
Fi routers, children’s toys and CCTV cameras, had security vulner-
abilities [8]. Through vulnerability testing, academic research has
also demonstrated that a number of security issues are consistently
found [9–13]. This is the case even for large manufacturers who
have the competency and resources to design secure products [9].
Discerning the security of an IoT product and communicating it in
an accessible way is thus key to ensuring that consumers can make
informed decisions about the IoT products they buy.
Discerning the security of Information Communication
Technology (ICT) products is difficult. Discerning the security of
IoT products is even more difficult, as doing so involves an assess-
ment of the security of the IoT device, its cloud services, its applica-
tion programming interface (API), and mobile applications [14]. IoT
devices also have differing capabilities [15], with some devices lack-
ing memory and physical capacity for security. Consequently, the
IoT is seen as widely insecure [2] and this is in a large part due to the
lack of security features built into products [3]. Due to such vulner-
abilities, we have already seen a number of cyberattacks that have
successfully exploited consumer IoT devices. Default login creden-
tials and a lack of security updates are just some of the poor features
that have been exploited at scale [16]. In response to the growing
threats, governments and industry security champions have started
to try and push manufacturers and the market toward better
security.
In March 2018, the UK government outlined what they consider
good security for consumer IoT products [17]. Their secure by de-
sign Code of Practice (CoP) outlines 13 principles that manufac-
turers should follow. They have also mapped the CoP onto existing
standards and IoT security recommendations [18] demonstrating
that the CoP is a useful overarching framework for IoT security. The
CoP outlines the following security features that should be provided:
1. no default passwords;
2. implement a vulnerability disclosure policy;
3. keep software updated;
4. securely store credentials and security-sensitive data;
5. communicate securely;
6. minimize exposed attack surfaces;
7. ensure software integrity;
8. ensure that personal data are protected;
9. make systems resilient to outages;
10. monitor system telemetry data;
11. make it easy for consumers to delete personal data;
12. make installation and maintenance of devices easy;
13. validate input data.
Alongside the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(DCMS) CoP, there exist numerous IoT security best practice guides
for manufacturers to follow [19]. However, what is not currently
understood is what proportion of IoT devices on the market disclose
the security features they offer to consumers. At present, only the
findings of tests by security researchers [3, 20], consumer groups
[21], and academic researchers [12] provide an indication of the se-
curity posture of IoT devices and market engagement with security.
While important, such information provides only a partial picture.
In this study, our primary aim was to identify what security features
are currently communicated about IoT devices and how they map
onto the DCMS CoP. To do this, we focused on the information
communicated by manufacturers in device manuals and associated
web pages (e.g. support pages and user forums). We chose to focus
on these communication mechanisms as (i) it allowed us to scrutin-
ize publicly available information about IoT devices, (ii) it allowed
us to understand the challenges consumers face when buying IoT
devices—since security information is communicated to them
through manuals and support pages,1 (iii) it provides a cost-effective
method to identify security features compared to testing IoT prod-
ucts in the lab and (iv) it allowed us to sample a broader range of
products than has been considered in previous research, by examin-
ing the products sold by UK retailers and those listed on IoT online
databases (e.g. iotlist.co).
Considering previous work that has examined the security of
devices, the approach taken largely focuses on assessing security for
key areas, such as the confidentiality of data, the integrity and au-
thentication of the IoT’s connection, access control and the avail-
ability of the device to connection requests, and the capability of the
device to participate in reflective distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks [9]. Other approaches focus on the presence of se-
curity features and the ‘vulnerability surface’ of a device, i.e. features
such as its interfaces, processing attack surface and systematic archi-
tecture that objectively make the device less secure [22]. Adopting a
similar approach to Jamieson [22], we focus on the presence or ab-
sence of security features as a way to derive the security posture of a
device as communicated in manuals and support pages. This
allowed us to examine the security of a device at a lower cost than
vulnerability testing individual IoT devices that other approaches re-
quire. A caveat, of course, is that the absence of a discussion of par-
ticular security features in device publications does not mean that
1 Information may also be communicated through apps and other means
during the set-up phase of a device, but consumers will not usually be
able to access this information prior to purchasing a device. Moreover,
the manuals and associated materials will represent an important source
of information for many consumers.
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those features are not present, just that they are not discussed in the
materials that accompany a device. In terms of objectively assessing
the security, a device offers this is an important methodological
point. However, from the perspective of the consumer who wants to
select a secure device prior to purchase, or who wants to be reas-
sured about the security a purchased device provides, these are just
semantics, since most consumers will not be able to conduct the
highly technical penetration tests required to assess the limits of a
device’s security. Thus, the approach we take here provides a ‘con-
sumer eye’ view of the security currently offered by devices.
A further challenge associated with consumer IoT is scalability,
which makes market surveillance difficult [23]. Consumer IoT is al-
ready ubiquitous, but if the hype of the IoT matches reality, the ma-
jority of consumer goods will be Internet connected in the future (up
from 6.4 billion connected ‘things’ to 20.8 billion by 2020 [24]). In
this context, it will not be feasible to require manufacturers to go
through independent penetration testing by third parties to obtain
certification for all aspects of security. Thus, while the monitoring
of compliance is clearly needed—to ensure that consumers are
protected—the mechanism for doing this remains unclear. One sug-
gestion is for the creation of a centralized database that details the
security features of devices and provides an ongoing assessment of
their security posture [23]. Presently, no such database exists and it
is likely to be many years before such a resource is available. The as-
sessment of device manuals and support pages thus allowed us to as-
sess the current state of play concerning the disclosure of security
features. As well as providing a snapshot of how things are current-
ly, the exercise is intended to inform future market surveillance
efforts.
The second aim of our study was to examine the provision of
cyber hygiene advice from manufacturers. That is, ‘what informa-
tion is provided by manufacturers to encourage consumers to pro-
tect their devices and reduce their risk of cybercrime’. Statistics
consistently show that consumers do not always engage in actions to
protect themselves from cybersecurity threats. For example, only
52% regularly download the latest software updates and only 32%
follow the latest government password advice [25]. Moreover, it is
well known that the majority of cybersecurity breaches involve a
human element [26] and so encouraging cyber hygiene is key to
helping protect consumers and their devices. In the case of the IoT,
this is even more challenging than it is for other ICT, as a number of
the behaviours expected of consumers are the result of poor design
(such as hard-coded default passwords) [17] rather than the result of
consumer non-compliance. Research [27] has also shown that there
are up to 43 security behaviours that consumers may have to engage
in to protect their IoT devices from purchase (e.g. ‘researching a
device’s security before purchasing’), set-up (e.g. ‘changing security
and privacy settings’) and maintenance (e.g. ‘updating devices’) to
ultimate disposal (e.g. ‘securely wiping devices before disposal’).
The burden for protecting devices is thus currently on consumers
and manufacturers need to reduce this through greater ‘security by
design’. However, it is important to understand how well the fea-
tures are described to consumers in user documentation and what (if
any) crime prevention messaging is used to persuade consumers to
follow them.
To summarize, in this study, we coded a sample of consumer IoT
devices manuals and product support pages to provide a picture of
the security features and cyber hygiene advice provided for different
Internet-connected devices. We seek to address the following three
research questions:
RQ1: What security features are communicated in consumer IoT
device manuals and support pages?
RQ2: How well do the identified security features map onto the
DCMS Secure by Design CoP?
RQ3: What cyber hygiene advice is communicated to consumers?
Methodology
We compiled a database of consumer IoT devices from the website
iotlist.co, and by extracting the names of devices listed under the
categories ‘smart home’ or ‘Internet of Things’ from the website of a
major UK retailer (PC World). We removed duplicate records and
similar devices from the same manufacturers (e.g. different versions
of the same device), which resulted in a database of 423 individual
devices. Of these, 153 were no longer sold or in development. The
final database consisted of 270 devices produced by 220 different
manufacturers. While not important to the current work, this attri-
tion is worth noting as it provides a crude illustration of the fact that
IoT products may disappear from the market relatively quickly,
which may create problems in the future if legacy devices and sys-
tems are not updated to keep them secure.
Search strategy for manuals and associated support
pages
To identify device security features, the first step was to identify if
the device came with a user manual. To locate the device manuals,
we used Google’s search engine and the following terms:
‘Device name’ AND ‘manual’ or ‘guide’ or ‘quick start’
In addition to searching for the device manuals, we searched for
associated online material published by the manufacturer that might
communicate details about the security of devices to consumers.
Such materials included support pages, user forums or frequently
asked questions pages. We developed our search strategy using
terms found in the DCMS CoP, as follows:
‘Device name’ AND ‘security’ or ‘encryption’ or ‘password’ or
‘updates’ or ‘vulnerability disclosure’
Coding strategy
Two researchers independently read all of the materials identified
and coded them using a ‘bottom-up’ approach. That is, they did not
restrict the security features coded to those outlined in the DCMS
CoP but rather coded any mention of device security features (as the
DCMS CoP may not account for all security features). From these
initial codes, a final coding scheme was derived—based on recurring
codes from the initial data set—using the principles of content ana-
lysis [28]. Together, the two researchers re-coded the security fea-
tures to the final coding scheme and mapped this to the DCMS CoP.
Any disagreements were resolved through discussion and refinement
of the coding scheme.
Results
Types of products
Table 1 shows the types of products identified from the iotlist.co
and UK retailer’s website, and the number of manuals or associated
materials identified for each. In total, details were available in
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manuals and online pages for 42 devices, on online web pages only
for 62 devices and in manuals alone for 66 devices. In terms of the
types of IoT devices covered, wearables were the most common
(n¼46), followed by home security (n¼35) and assistants (n¼22).
Below, we first discuss our findings in the aggregate (i.e. for all devi-
ces) and then provide detail for specific types of devices.
Frequency of security features
The mean number of security features discussed2 in the materials
analysed was 4.11 (SD¼1.86, min¼1, max¼9, and n¼170).
Of the nine devices for which the most security features were dis-
cussed (at least eight features), seven were produced by large
manufacturers,3 suggesting that larger manufacturers may provide
greater disclosure of the security features their devices ship with.
These larger manufacturers produced only 24% of the devices
sampled and so this finding cannot simply be explained by their
domination of the devices coded (i.e. they did not produce 7/9 of
devices examined). Considering the security features discussed,
user accounts were the most common (76.5%), followed by soft-
ware/firmware updates (62.4%) and factory resets (48.2%)
(Table 2). However, updates and factory resets were rarely actu-
ally framed around the discussion of security and in the majority
of cases, were instead discussed in relation to performance
improvement.
DCMS secure by design CoP
Considering the DCMS CoP, we were able to derive information
from manuals and related support pages for 5 of the 13 principles.
They are discussed here in order of prevalence.
CoP 3 ‘keep software updated’
Updates were one of the most commonly referenced features
(62.4%). However, in the majority of cases (90%), the information
provided did not explicitly mention security. Instead, updates were
usually discussed in the context of product functionality, with
quotes such as those below being typical:
Free feature enhancements and product improvements are occa-
sionally made available through firmware updates. We recom-
mend keeping your <product name> up to date.
Your <product name> device receives software updates auto-
matically over an active Internet connection. These updates usu-
ally improve performance and add new features.
For only 10% of the devices examined was security explicitly
mentioned as being an aspect of the updates provided. Example
quotes from manuals/support pages included the following:
Keep your beacons updated to enjoy all the new features which
we add on a regular basis. Each update also brings performance
improvements and security tweaks so you’ll always want to have
the latest firmware installed for the best experience.
Keeping your watch up to date enhances its performance,
improves apps’ features, and adds more security protection. If an
update is available, you will be receive a system notification on
your watch. However, you can manually check for software
updates.
CoP 11 ‘make it easy for consumers to delete personal data’
48.2% of products described some form of factory reset that could
be used to clear the data stored on the device. However, for only
2.4% of devices was specific advice given to consumers on how to
give away or sell their product and the procedures they should
undertake for wiping their personal information. For the majority of
devices, the discussion about factory resets was in relation to
improving the performance of the device, e.g.:
In case something goes terribly wrong with your <product
name>, you have the option to perform a factory reset. Note
that, when you do this, all your data and settings will be wiped
from your <product name>.
CoP 2 ‘implement a vulnerability disclosure policy’
The materials provided for 32.4% of products detailed a vulnerabil-
ity disclosure policy. This information was normally published on
the manufacturers’ website.
CoP 5 ‘communicate securely’
Discussions about the security of data and its communication were
discussed with reference to the following: Wi-Fi encryption
(20.0%), the encryption of data transmitted over the Internet or
other channels (16.5%), encryption at rest but not on the device
(15.3%), the security of cloud services (5.3%), local communication
Table 1: Frequency of type of products sampled
Type of product Number of
products
without any
information
Number of products
with information
discussed in
user manual
or website
Total
Wearable 15 31 46
Home security 7 28 35
Assistant 10 12 22
Smart energy 7 11 18
Smart lighting 9 6 15
Smart TV 3 12 15
Smart home monitoring 3 12 15
Smart gadgets 5 7 12
Smart health 5 6 11
Smart garden 3 6 9
Light control 5 3 8
Smart kitchen 4 4 8
Smart speaker 2 5 7
Smart transport 5 2 7
Smart baby monitors 2 5 7
Pet-related 4 2 6
Tracker 2 4 6
Exercise 4 1 5
Media centre 5 5
Children’s devices 1 4 5
Bluetooth pen 2 1 3
Smart plug 1 2 3
Headphones 1 1 2
Total 100 170 270
2 There were a possible total of 15 attributes - the need to change default
passwords was excluded from this list because advice to change them
indicates that a device was shipped with a default password (which is an
insecure practice).
3 These were Apple, Fitbit, NEST (2), Panasonic, Phillips, and Samsung.
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encryption such as Bluetooth and Z-wave (4.7%) and local data
storage on the device (2.9%).
With respect to the specific types of Wi-Fi encryption used, this
varied across the 34 products for which it was discussed, but most
devices were compatible with more than one standard and most used
the more secure Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) or Wi-Fi protected ac-
cess II (WPA2) standards (Table 3). Details of other encryption stand-
ards used for IoT devices included in this review are in the Appendix.
CoP 12 ‘make installation and maintenance of devices easy’
This element of the CoP makes reference to the need to provide
‘guidance on how to securely set up their device’. We found that for
10.0% of the devices, consumers were provided with advice about
how to secure their IoT products.
CoP 1 ‘no default passwords’
According to the user manuals and associated materials, only 4.7%
of the products sampled were shipped with a default password. Of
the remainder, 77.6% required the user to create login credentials or
a pin set-up instead of using default passwords. This suggests that
this insecure practice of having default passwords may currently be
in the minority.
Remaining CoP principles
From the information communicated to consumers, it was not pos-
sible to discern the extent to which the following CoP principles
were addressed: CoP 4 ‘securely store credentials and security-
sensitive data’ CoP 6 ‘minimize exposed attack surfaces’, CoP 7 ‘en-
sure software integrity’, CoP 8 ‘ensure that personal data are pro-
tected’, CoP 9 ‘make systems resilient to outages’, CoP 10 ‘make
systems resilient to outages’ and CoP 13 ‘validate input data’.
Cyber hygiene and crime prevention advice
As discussed, our third overarching question concerned what advice is
given to consumers about cyber security. We found that for 10.0% of
products, some kind of advice was provided. The majority of the ad-
vice provided concerned password hygiene and how to create a ‘strong
password’ (3.5%), although none of the advice was in line with the
UK National Cyber Security Centre guidance on password creation.
Instead, consumers were encouraged to create short and complex
passwords (random letters, numbers and symbols). For example:
. . . account password is secure enough to restrict access to your
account. It should be at least eight-character long, have mixed
case, and use a combination of alphanumeric and special
characters.
The written materials provided for two products encouraged
consumers to write their password down in the manual. For our
sample, the material associated with only 34 devices (or 20% of the
170 devices) provided consumers with information about Wi-Fi se-
curity. Of these, the majority did not provide specific recommenda-
tions about the encryption standard consumers should use. Table 4
shows the number of devices for which Wi-Fi encryption was
Table 2: Prevalence of security features and DCMS CoPa
Security feature Description DCMS CoP No. Devices (%)
User account management Information was provided about account management (e.g. password
protection, password reset, etc.)
NA 76.5
Software and firmware
updates
Whether the device offered updates (3) 62.4
Factory reset Factory reset was available (11) 48.2
Vulnerability disclosure
policy
Whether the manufacturer has a vulnerability disclosure policy in
place
(2) 32.4
Wi-Fi encryption standardsb Encryption standards were discussed (e.g. WPA and WPA2) (5) 20.0
Data encryption in motion Discussion of the encryption methods used when data are in motion
(e.g. TLS and HTTPS)
(5) 16.5
Product lock The device could be locked to prevent unauthorized access NA 17.1
Encryption at rest How data (e.g. AES) were encrypted when at rest were discussed (5) 15.3
Cyber hygiene advice Advice was given to encourage cybersecurity behaviours (12) 10.0
Privacy features Additional features discussed that help to protect the privacy of the
user’s data (e.g. limiting sharing of location)
NA 10.0
Permission management Owner could delegate or revoke permissions for use and access to data
stored on devices
NA 7.6
Security of the cloud There was discussion of the security of the cloud services that the prod-
uct used
(5) 5.3
No default passwords Devices are not shipped with default passwords and require credentials
to login
(1) 78
Local communications
encryption
Information was provided about how local communications were
encrypted
(5) 4.7
Local data storage Data were only stored on the device locally (5) 2.9
2FA User was encouraged to use 2FA to secure online accounts NA 1.8
aThe fractions are for those products for which there was either a manual, online support pages or both.
bA breakdown of compatible and recommended Wi-Fi encryption standard is in Tables 3 and 4.
NA, not applicable.
Table 3: Device encryption standards discussed in manuals
Compatible Wi-Fi encryption standard (n¼ 34)
Encryption standard WEP WPA WPA2 WAC WPS Not specified
Number of devices 22 27 29 1 2 2
% 69 84 91 3 6 6
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discussed, and where more than one standard was provided, which
was the preferred option.
For less than 2% (1.2%) of products, there was a discussion of
the need for consumers to install updates for security reasons, des-
pite software updates being discussed as a feature for 62.4% of
products. The materials reviewed for two products provided general
guidance on how consumers could protect themselves and their
home in reference to cybercrime. For example:
Q: How can I prevent a cybercriminal from making unauthorized
changes to my thermostat?
A: If a cybercriminal gains access to your Wi-Fi router, they can
tamper with a wide range of online activities, including the set-
tings on your connected devices. Make sure you change the de-
fault password on your Wi-Fi router, and when you select a new
password, make sure it uses multiple upper- and lower-case let-
ters and special characters.
Finally, 2.4% provided guidance on how to give away or sell a
product whilst keeping data safe. For example:
For security purposes, if you give away or recycle your <product
name>, make sure you first remove any personal data. To erase
your . . ..
None of the communications around cyber hygiene advice com-
municated the risks of non-compliance to the consumer.
Type of product
Table 5 provides a breakdown of the security features discussed in
user manuals and associated materials by type of product. When
looking at this, it is important to note that the sample size differs by
product. And, while we sampled devices listed on a major retailer’s
website and Iotlist.co, our list of devices is not exhaustive and it is
possible that our sample is not representative of the population of
devices in use today. As such, we suggest that the data are inter-
preted cautiously. However, there are a number of trends worth not-
ing. First, for our sample, home entry and smart health devices
appeared to provide more cyber hygiene advice in their manuals
than was the case for other products. Secondly, and somewhat
expected, devices with a direct interface on the product were more
likely to provide a product lock function (e.g. smart TVs). Thirdly,
smart entry products had the highest frequency of permission set-
tings. Finally, the bad practice of shipping with default passwords or
Pins was highest for smart TVs.
Discussion
The current study aimed to (i) identify what security features are
communicated to consumers in device manuals and support pages,
(ii) explore the extent to which these features can be mapped onto
the DCMS Secure by Design CoP and (iii) identify what cyber
hygiene advice is communicated to consumers. Our review suggests
that manufacturers are not providing enough information to con-
sumers about the security features of their devices. On average, there
was discussion of around four security features, with account man-
agement and software updates being the most frequently mentioned.
Despite these features being important for security, they were rarely
spoken about in relation to security. Instead, they were largely dis-
cussed in terms of product use and maintenance, or product
functionality.
The DCMS Secure by Design CoP outlines what ‘good’ security
of a consumer IoT product looks like. We found that we were able
to discern information for only 5 of the 13 principles. DCMS priori-
tize the top three principles (CoP 1 ‘no default passwords’, CoP 2
‘implement a vulnerability disclosure policy’ and CoP 3 ‘keep soft-
ware updated’) as they represent the key issues that the market needs
to address immediately. We were able to derive information for all
three of these key principles. For the use of default passwords, we
found that—according to the material reviewed—around 4.7% of
devices followed this poor practice suggesting that its prevalence in
the market is not that widespread, although it is a major contribu-
ting factor in IoT botnets [29]. For vulnerability disclosure policies,
only 32.4% of the sampled products had one in place. These policies
are important for the security community as it allows responsible
disclosure of security vulnerabilities to manufacturers. In their ab-
sence, it can mean that (discovered) vulnerabilities of IoT devices do
not get fixed. Finally, for software updates, we found that for
62.4% of products, updates were discussed. However, security was
discussed in only 10% of cases. Moreover, across all of the products
sampled, there was no indication of how long security updates
would be provided. Since this can vary across products, and is critic-
al to their ongoing security, it is important that this information is
communicated to consumers at (or prior to) the point of purchase.
At present, it would appear that it is not. In short, for the devices
sampled, DCMS CoP 3 was rarely addressed.
The remaining principles from the CoP were more difficult to
discern as they related to storage of credentials (CoP 4), attack surfa-
ces (CoP 6), software integrity (CoP 7), system resilience (CoP 9),
the monitoring of system telemetry data (CoP 10) and the validation
of data input (CoP 13). It would be unlikely for a manufacturer to
disclose this information to consumers as it is not related to the
maintenance of products, and so would not be obvious information
to disclose in device manuals at present. Furthermore, some of this
information is highly technical and so would be understood by a mi-
nority of consumers.
Perhaps most concerning is the fact that cyber hygiene advice
was rarely provided to consumers, with guidance being provided for
only 10% of products for which manuals or associated materials
were available. In line with this, existing research has shown that
the general public mainly learns about security via device prompts
when they are forced to take action by a device, or through advice
from family/friends [30]. In a further study, Redmiles et al. [31]
assessed the readability of security advice provided in 1878
Table 4:Wi-Fi encryption standards recommended to consumers
Recommended Wi-Fi encryption standard to users (n¼ 34)a
Recommended encryption standard No recommendation WPA WPA2 WPA/WPA2
Number of devices 23 0 4 2
% 69 0 9 6
aFive devices used only one Wi-Fi encryption standard or did not specify which standards were used, and so for these, there was no recommendation.
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documents concerning online behaviour drawn from sources,
including help pages, policies and the media. They found that in
only 25 cases was the advice provided written to an adequately com-
prehensible standard. It is worth noting that they did not assess the
extent to which the information followed the latest government
guidance. Here, we focused on manuals as a source of advice and
found that it was rarely given and where it was, it was not typically
in line with the kind of people-centric advice provided by the
National Cyber Security Centre [32]. Furthermore, the kinds of
behaviour change techniques that are necessary to encourage cyber
hygiene—such as ‘providing information about consequences’
[33]—were not employed in any of the manuals. It is well known
that certain techniques (such as communications versus training) are
associated with greater effectiveness and for the specific psycho-
logical constructs they seek to target (e.g. risk reception) [34, 35].
However, in the context of the IoT, further work is needed to iden-
tify the optimal behaviour change techniques for manual/support
pages communications to encourage cyber hygiene behaviour, and
there is a need to use a systematic approach to behaviour change
intervention design [36].
At present, a consumer cannot discern the security of one device
over another, which is particularly problematic during purchasing.
In the absence of regulation or a labelling scheme on products, con-
sumers have to ‘research a product before purchasing’ [36]. We have
shown in this study that even if a consumer wanted to do such re-
search (and if they have the technical capability to undertake it), the
information is not provided to them by manufacturers. Instead,
there is an information asymmetry. Consumers are therefore at a
disadvantage when protecting themselves in the context of the IoT.
A labelling scheme is one mechanism that could be used to commu-
nicate a device’s security posture to consumers, and other work con-
ducted as part of the PETRAS Consumer Security Index project [37]
is exploring this. Another potential mechanism is for the informa-
tion to be disclosed in a centralized database that has both consumer
and government facing parts [23]. With respect to the information
asymmetry, DCMS has recently stated that they cannot give advice
to consumers about purchasing IoT devices as little information is
provided about the security features of devices, whether updates are
provided, and if the product warranty includes the update period
[38]. Our findings support DCMS’s concern and support the need
for a labelling scheme to reduce this information asymmetry in se-
curity that prevents consumers from buying secure products [37].
Overall, we found that there is a lack of standardization in the
communication of security-related information for IoT devices.
There are no industry standards for manufacturers and the informa-
tion that is currently presented in manuals and other materials
depends on the manufacturer’s due diligence rather than a common
standard. Compare this to energy efficiency, for which manufac-
turers must specify an energy efficiency performance table in bro-
chures and associated documents, and make the technical
documentation available to the UK Office for Product Safety and
Standards, if requested [39]. Similar standardization for the commu-
nication of IoT device security is needed to help consumers and mar-
ket surveillance authorities discern the security of devices—whether
this is to be disclosed in manuals, in a centralized database, or in
some other way. If standardized information were disclosed in de-
vice manuals, this could be made machine readable so that informa-
tion could be collated by third parties and simplified in a way that is
accessible to consumers. However, this would need to be reported in
a relatively standardized way to facilitate its reliable extraction.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations with the current study. First, we
derived our sample from a database of IoT products and from a
major UK retailer. As such, the sample largely represents products
from well-known manufacturers and may not be representative of
the market of consumer IoT devices, particularly those cheaper devi-
ces sold on sites such as eBay, for example.
Secondly, due to budget constraints, we could not analyse the
software applications (‘apps’) for each of the devices. Information
about security features may be communicated within the app of the
device, but it was not possible to test this. However, the benefit of
the current study is that it assesses publicly available information,
which is representative of what is accessible to consumers prior to
purchase—what we described above as the ‘consumer eye view’.
Thirdly, assessing the implementation of security features
through vulnerability testing was beyond the scope of this report but
is an integral aspect of IoT security that we do not wish to underre-
present. This study demonstrates what information can be derived
from device user manuals and support pages to give an indication of
a device’s security posture, but it is not the last word.
Conclusion
The manuals and support pages of consumer IoT devices do not pro-
vide adequate information about device security features. Of those
that disclosed features, we were able to derive information on the
top three principles from the DCMS CoP. Cyber hygiene advice is
rarely provided in manuals, despite the importance it can play in
preventing cybercrime. We suggest that what is communicated in
manuals should be standardized and that, as suggested by Kleinhans
[23], security information should be stored in a centralized reposi-
tory. Doing so would aid market surveillance and perhaps, more im-
portantly, allow device security to be summarized in a more
accessible format for consumers (e.g. through a labelling scheme) to
aid their purchasing choices.
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Appendix
Table A1: Glossary of terms
Abbreviation Term Definition
2FA Two factor
authentication
A method for authenticating a users’ identity using two different factors. These can include something
they know (e.g. a password), a physical possession (e.g. a USB key or bank card), or factors associated
with the user (e.g. biometrics). App generated codes are another example.
AES Advanced encryp-
tion standard
Is a cryptographic algorithm used to encrypt or secure data. It uses a symmetric-key block cipher algo-
rithm (which can be used encrypt and decrypt data) and has cryptographic key sizes of 128, 192 and
256 bits. The larger the bit size, the more secure the data.
API Application pro-
gramming
interface
A set of subroutine definitions, communication protocols and tools for building software applications
(including websites) that interact with one another.
DDoS Distributed denial
of service
A method of cyberattack for which the perpetrator seeks to make a targeted machine or network re-
source unavailable by flooding (or overwhelming) it with traffic from many different sources.
Digital
certificate
An electronic document, signed by a certificate authority, which verifies the identity of an individual, an
entity or a company owning the website/app on the Internet.
FHSS Frequency-hop-
ping spread
spectrum
A method of transmitting radio signals by rapidly switching a carrier among many frequency channels,
using a pseudorandom sequence known to both the transmitter and receiver. The aim is to make the
signal resistant to interception.
Hard-coded
password
A practice of embedding a password directly into the source code of a programme or other executable
object, making it permanent.
HMAC Hash-based mes-
sage authentica-
tion code
A method used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity and the authentication of a message sent
between two systems.
HTTP Hypertext transfer
protocol
Hypertext transfer protocol for communication over a communication network without encryption.
HTTPS Hypertext transfer
protocol secure
An extension of HTTP for ‘secure’ communication over a computer network. HTTPS uses SSL or TLS
to encrypt the data.
PKI Public key
infrastructure
With PKI, a public key is used to encrypt data and a private key is used to decrypt it.
SSL Secured sockets
layer
A standard security technology for establishing an encrypted link between two systems (typically a server
and a client).
TLS Transport layer
security
An updated and more secure version of SSL.
WAC Wireless accessory
configuration
Apple’s licensed technology designed for accessories that connect to iPod, iPhone and iPad without
requiring the user to type in the network name and password.
WEP Wired equivalent
privacy
An early generation of security protocols for protecting wireless communication.
WPA Wi-Fi protected
access
A security protocol for protecting secure wireless communication. WPA was introduced after WEP and
is more secure.
WPA2 Wi-Fi protected
access II
A security protocol for protecting secure wireless communication. WPA2 was introduced after WPA and
is more secure as it uses more advanced encryption.
WPS Wi-Fi protected
setup
A network security standard to create a secure wireless home network. It is considered less secure than
newer standards, such as WPA and WPA2.
Z-wave A wireless communication protocol, using low-energy radio waves for home automation. It allows home
appliances, such as IoT devices to communicate with each other.
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